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From: josh@joshtriplett.org
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Emily Ratliff <eratliff@linuxfoundation.org>,
	ksummit-discuss@lists.linuxfoundation.org,
	Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Subject: Re: [Ksummit-discuss] [TECH TOPIC] Kernel Hardening
Date: Mon, 31 Aug 2015 13:22:20 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20150831202220.GA3733@cloud> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <871tejdxt2.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org>

On Mon, Aug 31, 2015 at 03:10:01PM -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> Greg KH <greg@kroah.com> writes:
> 
> > On Mon, Aug 24, 2015 at 12:00:15PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> >> On Mon, Aug 24, 2015 at 11:52 AM, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> wrote:
> >> > On Mon, 24 Aug 2015, Kees Cook wrote:
> >> >> On Mon, Aug 24, 2015 at 4:56 AM, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> wrote:
> >> >> This is far from a comprehensive list, though. The biggest value, I
> >> >> think, would be in using KERNEXEC, UDEREF, USERCOPY, and the plugins
> >> >> for constification and integer overflow.
> >> >
> >> > There is another aspect. We need to make developers more aware of the
> >> > potential attack issues. I learned my lesson with the futex disaster
> >> > and since then I certainly look with a different set of eyes at user
> >> > space facing code. I doubt that we want that everyone experiences the
> >> > disaster himself (though that's a very enlightening experience), but
> >> > we should try to document incidents and the lessons learned from
> >> > them. Right now we just rely on those who are deep into the security
> >> > realm or the few people who learned it the hard way.
> >> 
> >> Yeah, it can be a hard perspective shift to make. And shifting the
> >> thinking about the kernel itself to always operating in a compromised
> >> state makes thinking about how to protect it much easier. User space
> >> is trying to hurt us! :)
> >
> > Microsoft's security team, which was responsible for forcing all of
> > their developers to undergo some security training every year, has
> > boiled it all down to these simple 4 words:
> >
> > 	All input is evil.
> 
> I have a linux version of that one.
> 
> An unprivileged user can call that.
> 
> It is absolutely amazing how much kernel code does not worry
> about evil input after it checks that the caller is root.

Another that has only started getting consideration recently: relative to the
kernel, root has less privilege.

- Josh Triplett

  reply	other threads:[~2015-08-31 20:22 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 57+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-08-24  4:20 James Morris
2015-08-24 11:46 ` Jiri Kosina
2015-08-24 11:56   ` James Morris
2015-08-24 17:17     ` Kees Cook
2015-08-24 17:28       ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-08-24 17:39         ` Julia Lawall
2015-08-24 18:01         ` Kees Cook
2015-08-24 18:19           ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-08-24 18:57             ` Kees Cook
2015-08-24 18:52       ` Thomas Gleixner
2015-08-24 18:59         ` Thomas Gleixner
2015-08-24 19:00         ` Kees Cook
2015-08-24 22:05           ` Greg KH
2015-08-25  0:51             ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2015-08-31 20:10             ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-08-31 20:22               ` josh [this message]
2015-08-26 20:51       ` Kees Cook
2015-08-26 21:10         ` Matthew Garrett
2015-08-30  0:41           ` [Ksummit-discuss] Self nomination Matthew Garrett
2015-08-24 11:48 ` [Ksummit-discuss] [TECH TOPIC] Kernel Hardening Jiri Kosina
2015-08-24 12:29 ` Linus Walleij
2015-08-24 12:51   ` Jason Cooper
2015-08-24 16:35   ` Kees Cook
2015-08-24 20:09     ` James Bottomley
2015-08-24 20:17       ` James Morris
2015-08-24 20:46         ` Thomas Gleixner
2015-08-24 22:22           ` James Morris
2015-08-24 23:20             ` Kees Cook
2015-08-24 23:54               ` Theodore Ts'o
2015-08-25  0:06                 ` James Morris
2015-08-25  0:06                 ` Kees Cook
2015-08-27 22:08                   ` [Ksummit-discuss] grsecurity and kernel hardening Stephen Hemminger
2015-08-27 22:49                     ` James Bottomley
2015-08-27 23:03                       ` Stephen Hemminger
2015-08-24 23:04           ` [Ksummit-discuss] [TECH TOPIC] Kernel Hardening Kees Cook
2015-08-25 16:45           ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2015-08-24 22:57         ` Kees Cook
2015-08-24 23:25           ` Kees Cook
2015-08-24 20:28       ` josh
2015-08-24 22:55       ` Kees Cook
2015-08-24 23:13         ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-08-31 20:58         ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-09-01  9:03           ` Jiri Kosina
2015-09-01 16:52             ` Kees Cook
2015-09-01 16:50           ` Kees Cook
2015-08-25 15:15     ` Shuah Khan
2015-08-25 16:15       ` Kees Cook
2015-08-25 16:30       ` Mark Brown
2015-08-25 16:33         ` Kees Cook
2015-08-25 16:58         ` Shuah Khan
2015-09-22 12:24     ` Dan Carpenter
2015-09-22 12:55       ` Yves-Alexis Perez
2015-09-22 12:59       ` Julia Lawall
2015-09-22 18:02         ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-08-24 16:20 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2015-08-24 17:19   ` Kees Cook
2015-08-24 18:50     ` James Morris

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