From: josh@joshtriplett.org
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Emily Ratliff <eratliff@linuxfoundation.org>,
ksummit-discuss@lists.linuxfoundation.org,
Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Subject: Re: [Ksummit-discuss] [TECH TOPIC] Kernel Hardening
Date: Mon, 31 Aug 2015 13:22:20 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20150831202220.GA3733@cloud> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <871tejdxt2.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org>
On Mon, Aug 31, 2015 at 03:10:01PM -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> Greg KH <greg@kroah.com> writes:
>
> > On Mon, Aug 24, 2015 at 12:00:15PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> >> On Mon, Aug 24, 2015 at 11:52 AM, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> wrote:
> >> > On Mon, 24 Aug 2015, Kees Cook wrote:
> >> >> On Mon, Aug 24, 2015 at 4:56 AM, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> wrote:
> >> >> This is far from a comprehensive list, though. The biggest value, I
> >> >> think, would be in using KERNEXEC, UDEREF, USERCOPY, and the plugins
> >> >> for constification and integer overflow.
> >> >
> >> > There is another aspect. We need to make developers more aware of the
> >> > potential attack issues. I learned my lesson with the futex disaster
> >> > and since then I certainly look with a different set of eyes at user
> >> > space facing code. I doubt that we want that everyone experiences the
> >> > disaster himself (though that's a very enlightening experience), but
> >> > we should try to document incidents and the lessons learned from
> >> > them. Right now we just rely on those who are deep into the security
> >> > realm or the few people who learned it the hard way.
> >>
> >> Yeah, it can be a hard perspective shift to make. And shifting the
> >> thinking about the kernel itself to always operating in a compromised
> >> state makes thinking about how to protect it much easier. User space
> >> is trying to hurt us! :)
> >
> > Microsoft's security team, which was responsible for forcing all of
> > their developers to undergo some security training every year, has
> > boiled it all down to these simple 4 words:
> >
> > All input is evil.
>
> I have a linux version of that one.
>
> An unprivileged user can call that.
>
> It is absolutely amazing how much kernel code does not worry
> about evil input after it checks that the caller is root.
Another that has only started getting consideration recently: relative to the
kernel, root has less privilege.
- Josh Triplett
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-08-31 20:22 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 57+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-08-24 4:20 James Morris
2015-08-24 11:46 ` Jiri Kosina
2015-08-24 11:56 ` James Morris
2015-08-24 17:17 ` Kees Cook
2015-08-24 17:28 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-08-24 17:39 ` Julia Lawall
2015-08-24 18:01 ` Kees Cook
2015-08-24 18:19 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-08-24 18:57 ` Kees Cook
2015-08-24 18:52 ` Thomas Gleixner
2015-08-24 18:59 ` Thomas Gleixner
2015-08-24 19:00 ` Kees Cook
2015-08-24 22:05 ` Greg KH
2015-08-25 0:51 ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2015-08-31 20:10 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-08-31 20:22 ` josh [this message]
2015-08-26 20:51 ` Kees Cook
2015-08-26 21:10 ` Matthew Garrett
2015-08-30 0:41 ` [Ksummit-discuss] Self nomination Matthew Garrett
2015-08-24 11:48 ` [Ksummit-discuss] [TECH TOPIC] Kernel Hardening Jiri Kosina
2015-08-24 12:29 ` Linus Walleij
2015-08-24 12:51 ` Jason Cooper
2015-08-24 16:35 ` Kees Cook
2015-08-24 20:09 ` James Bottomley
2015-08-24 20:17 ` James Morris
2015-08-24 20:46 ` Thomas Gleixner
2015-08-24 22:22 ` James Morris
2015-08-24 23:20 ` Kees Cook
2015-08-24 23:54 ` Theodore Ts'o
2015-08-25 0:06 ` James Morris
2015-08-25 0:06 ` Kees Cook
2015-08-27 22:08 ` [Ksummit-discuss] grsecurity and kernel hardening Stephen Hemminger
2015-08-27 22:49 ` James Bottomley
2015-08-27 23:03 ` Stephen Hemminger
2015-08-24 23:04 ` [Ksummit-discuss] [TECH TOPIC] Kernel Hardening Kees Cook
2015-08-25 16:45 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2015-08-24 22:57 ` Kees Cook
2015-08-24 23:25 ` Kees Cook
2015-08-24 20:28 ` josh
2015-08-24 22:55 ` Kees Cook
2015-08-24 23:13 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-08-31 20:58 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-09-01 9:03 ` Jiri Kosina
2015-09-01 16:52 ` Kees Cook
2015-09-01 16:50 ` Kees Cook
2015-08-25 15:15 ` Shuah Khan
2015-08-25 16:15 ` Kees Cook
2015-08-25 16:30 ` Mark Brown
2015-08-25 16:33 ` Kees Cook
2015-08-25 16:58 ` Shuah Khan
2015-09-22 12:24 ` Dan Carpenter
2015-09-22 12:55 ` Yves-Alexis Perez
2015-09-22 12:59 ` Julia Lawall
2015-09-22 18:02 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-08-24 16:20 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2015-08-24 17:19 ` Kees Cook
2015-08-24 18:50 ` James Morris
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