From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6D003E0A for ; Sun, 30 Aug 2015 00:41:08 +0000 (UTC) Received: from cavan.codon.org.uk (cavan.codon.org.uk [93.93.128.6]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 8471710D for ; Sun, 30 Aug 2015 00:41:07 +0000 (UTC) Date: Sun, 30 Aug 2015 01:41:04 +0100 From: Matthew Garrett To: Kees Cook Message-ID: <20150830004103.GA24295@srcf.ucam.org> References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: Cc: ksummit-discuss@lists.linuxfoundation.org Subject: [Ksummit-discuss] Self nomination List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Unsure whether Kees suggesting me is sufficient, so: I'd like to be involved if we're going to have a meaningful discussion about more proactively mitigating attacks on the kernel. I've been working full-time in the security field for about the past three years, and it's certainly resulted in a fairly strong shift in attitude towards how well we're doing here. At this point even Microsoft are showing more aggressive security development than we are, and when the only person who appears to be doing meaningful work in adding mitigation features to the kernel is Kees, that's kind of a bad sign. I've been doing development in this field for some time now - the secure boot patchset is an attempt to avoid allowing userspace privilege escalations to turn into persistent kernel compromises, for instance. As a member of the SFC's kernel copyright enforcement group, I'm also interested in being involved in any legal discussions that come up. Even if I don't make the invite list, I'd hope that these both end up as high priority topics. -- Matthew Garrett | mjg59@srcf.ucam.org