From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id CE19B953 for ; Mon, 24 Aug 2015 22:05:29 +0000 (UTC) Received: from out4-smtp.messagingengine.com (out4-smtp.messagingengine.com [66.111.4.28]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D417022F for ; Mon, 24 Aug 2015 22:05:28 +0000 (UTC) Received: from compute4.internal (compute4.nyi.internal [10.202.2.44]) by mailout.nyi.internal (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1AFFC22B87 for ; Mon, 24 Aug 2015 18:05:28 -0400 (EDT) Date: Mon, 24 Aug 2015 17:05:25 -0500 From: Greg KH To: Kees Cook Message-ID: <20150824220525.GA15701@kroah.com> References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: Cc: Jiri Kosina , Emily Ratliff , ksummit-discuss@lists.linuxfoundation.org Subject: Re: [Ksummit-discuss] [TECH TOPIC] Kernel Hardening List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , On Mon, Aug 24, 2015 at 12:00:15PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote: > On Mon, Aug 24, 2015 at 11:52 AM, Thomas Gleixner wrote: > > On Mon, 24 Aug 2015, Kees Cook wrote: > >> On Mon, Aug 24, 2015 at 4:56 AM, James Morris wrote: > >> This is far from a comprehensive list, though. The biggest value, I > >> think, would be in using KERNEXEC, UDEREF, USERCOPY, and the plugins > >> for constification and integer overflow. > > > > There is another aspect. We need to make developers more aware of the > > potential attack issues. I learned my lesson with the futex disaster > > and since then I certainly look with a different set of eyes at user > > space facing code. I doubt that we want that everyone experiences the > > disaster himself (though that's a very enlightening experience), but > > we should try to document incidents and the lessons learned from > > them. Right now we just rely on those who are deep into the security > > realm or the few people who learned it the hard way. > > Yeah, it can be a hard perspective shift to make. And shifting the > thinking about the kernel itself to always operating in a compromised > state makes thinking about how to protect it much easier. User space > is trying to hurt us! :) Microsoft's security team, which was responsible for forcing all of their developers to undergo some security training every year, has boiled it all down to these simple 4 words: All input is evil.