From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp2.linuxfoundation.org (smtp2.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.36]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 0AAF8BC4 for ; Wed, 15 Jul 2015 23:28:09 +0000 (UTC) Received: from smtprelay.hostedemail.com (smtprelay0173.hostedemail.com [216.40.44.173]) by smtp2.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3E7BA1DCA1 for ; Wed, 15 Jul 2015 23:28:06 +0000 (UTC) Received: from smtprelay.hostedemail.com (10.5.19.251.rfc1918.com [10.5.19.251]) by smtpgrave06.hostedemail.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4F5541727AA for ; Wed, 15 Jul 2015 18:42:18 +0000 (UTC) Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2015 14:42:12 -0400 From: Steven Rostedt To: Jiri Kosina Message-ID: <20150715144212.235f7687@gandalf.local.home> In-Reply-To: References: <20150710143832.GU23515@io.lakedaemon.net> <20150710162328.GB12009@thunk.org> <1436599873.2243.10.camel@HansenPartnership.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Cc: James Bottomley , Josh Boyer , Jason Cooper , ksummit-discuss@lists.linuxfoundation.org Subject: Re: [Ksummit-discuss] [CORE TOPIC] dev/maintainer workflow security List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , On Mon, 13 Jul 2015 10:32:06 +0200 (CEST) Jiri Kosina wrote: > On Sat, 11 Jul 2015, James Bottomley wrote: > > > > - personal security (keep commit credentials secure from theft) > > > > This second one is a bit of a red herring: Assuming you did steal my > > credentials, how would you use them without being detected? > > If the credentials can be used both to push to ra.kernel.org and to access > your "local" copy of the GIT repo (on your notebook / desktop / storage), > I can just push the malicious commit (*) to both repos and you might not > notice immediately (because you wouldn't get non-fast-forward hint from > git). Actually, I do development on a different box than I push with. Thus, if someone did modify both that box and my korg repo, I would notice a problem as soon as I push my development box to the box I push with. Now the attacker would need to compromise that development box too. -- Steve