From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5FCD0256 for ; Fri, 22 Jul 2016 11:01:45 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mx1.redhat.com (mx1.redhat.com [209.132.183.28]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 0290710A for ; Fri, 22 Jul 2016 11:01:44 +0000 (UTC) Received: from int-mx13.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com (int-mx13.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.11.26]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mx1.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7BA527F415 for ; Fri, 22 Jul 2016 11:01:44 +0000 (UTC) From: David Howells To: ksummit-discuss@lists.linuxfoundation.org MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-ID: <15841.1469185302.1@warthog.procyon.org.uk> Date: Fri, 22 Jul 2016 12:01:42 +0100 Message-ID: <15842.1469185302@warthog.procyon.org.uk> Cc: ikent@redhat.com, oleg@redhat.com Subject: [Ksummit-discuss] [TECH TOPIC] Containerisation, namespaces and keyrings List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , I'm not sure this is the right venue for this, but keyrings will need to be namespaced/containerised at some point. The problem is that it's an icky problem given that different key types really want to live in different namespaces, and upcalls may want to done in different containers, depending on the key type. For example, DNS resolver keys - should they be in the network, the filesystem namespace or neither? Should the upcall be in the current container or the root container? Authentication keys, such as used by kafs and AF_RXRPC - should they be in the filesystem namespace (kafs is an fs), the network namespace (AF_RXRPC is a net protocol) or the user namespace? Should crypto keys, such as the asymmetric key type, be in the user namespace? What about use by module signing? Should key operations in the current container have access to a blacklist in the root container? Should key verification in the current container have access to system keyrings? The TPM? This might actually be right for a hallway track. David