From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8184621 for ; Fri, 2 May 2014 21:27:09 +0000 (UTC) Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (bedivere.hansenpartnership.com [66.63.167.143]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 39A1E1F8D1 for ; Fri, 2 May 2014 21:27:09 +0000 (UTC) Message-ID: <1399066024.2202.72.camel@dabdike> From: James Bottomley To: Josh Boyer Date: Fri, 02 May 2014 14:27:04 -0700 In-Reply-To: References: <20140502164438.GA1423@jtriplet-mobl1> <20140502171103.GA725@redhat.com> <1399051229.2202.49.camel@dabdike> <20140502173309.GB725@redhat.com> <5363E8E1.9030806@zytor.com> <20140502193314.GA24108@thunk.org> <20140502194935.GA9766@redhat.com> <20140502204141.GB24108@thunk.org> <20140502210123.GA13536@redhat.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="ISO-8859-15" Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Cc: Sarah Sharp , ksummit-discuss@lists.linuxfoundation.org, Greg KH , Julia Lawall , Darren Hart , Dan Carpenter Subject: Re: [Ksummit-discuss] [CORE TOPIC] Kernel tinification: shrinking the kernel and avoiding size regressions List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , On Fri, 2014-05-02 at 17:19 -0400, Josh Boyer wrote: > On Fri, May 2, 2014 at 5:01 PM, Dave Jones wrote: > > On Fri, May 02, 2014 at 04:41:41PM -0400, Theodore Ts'o wrote: > > > > > And I think we can also further break this down into the classes of > > > code which require root privs (i.e., like kexec), and those which can > > > be used by any userid. > > > > In the brave new world of secure boot, we kind of have to care about > > even the root cases now too [*], but I agree in the general case. > > Speaking of that... is it worth my time to propose a "What to do about > the secure_modules/trusted_kernel/whatever patch set that distros are > carrying to support Secure Boot? I thought we had agreement and a > path forward at LPC last year, but things seem to have gotten derailed > again. Would you believe we're just discussing with the distros how we might re-engineer the Linux secure boot process. Unfortunately the details depend on a UEFI forum proposal that are UEFI confidential at this time, but you can probably pick them up from Peter Jones, since you're a Red Hat employee. One of the side effects of this, if it happens, will be to separate Linux secure boot policy from Microsoft's binary signing requirements which might take some of the heat out of the arguments about which parts of the patch are to please microsoft and refocus the debate towards how we make better use of secure boot. I'll try and ensure that either the proposals are public by KS or that we have permission to share the details. James