From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6B7528D9 for ; Wed, 12 Aug 2015 22:45:10 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mx1.redhat.com (mx1.redhat.com [209.132.183.28]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 09B1A1FC for ; Wed, 12 Aug 2015 22:45:10 +0000 (UTC) From: David Howells In-Reply-To: <1439405139.3100.147.camel@infradead.org> References: <1439405139.3100.147.camel@infradead.org> <20436.1438090619@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <1438096213.5441.147.camel@HansenPartnership.com> <1438097471.5441.152.camel@HansenPartnership.com> <1438099839.5441.165.camel@HansenPartnership.com> <1438100102.26913.183.camel@infradead.org> <30361.1438101879@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <1438111168.26913.189.camel@infradead.org> <1438121016.5441.233.camel@HansenPartnership.com> <16035.1439324695@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <11239.1439403720@warthog.procyon.org.uk> To: David Woodhouse MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Date: Wed, 12 Aug 2015 23:45:03 +0100 Message-ID: <13252.1439419503@warthog.procyon.org.uk> Cc: James Bottomley , Luis Rodriguez , "ksummit-discuss@lists.linuxfoundation.org" , Kyle McMartin Subject: Re: [Ksummit-discuss] [TECH TOPIC] Firmware signing List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , David Woodhouse wrote: > No. Just use a *hash* of the acceptable signing cert(s)=C2=B9. Note that = the > SKID is *usually* a hash of the public key, but isn't guaranteed to be > so, so using the SKID to specify the acceptable signing cert isn't > secure. True. That's one of the reasons I don't like SKIDs - the specification is very vague and non-enforcing. We would need a 'standard' for how to hash t= he public key data. Some types of public key, for example, have more than one integer. I wonder if we could just take the PGP method as the standard - though that does require extra elements. > The actual signing cert doesn't need to be present in full because we > can require it to be present in the PKCS#7 signature. True. I suppose for firmware this might not be so bad since any particular public key isn't going to sign all that many blobs, so having duplicates wouldn't take up all that much space. David